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Abstract 
North Korea’s road of survival began in the aftermath of World War II, when the 
United States and the Soviet Union sparred over rival ideologies. Ultimately, Korea split 
into a free south and an authoritarian north. Over seventy years later, North Korea 
remains a bastion of communism. Nuclear weaponry is a factor behind North Korea’s 
survival, and the history of their program can offer insight for American policy makers 
today. This paper offers a history of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program during the 
Clinton presidency, along with recommendations for present day policy makers. Without 
an understanding of history decision-makers tend to make mistakes and act rashly. It is 
imperative America understands its diplomatic issues with North Korea, and provide 
diplomatic, strategic, and military solutions for future negotiations.  
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Introduction 
 Nations pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons for various reasons. Some 
acquire them to gain a military advantage; others want to counter the intentions of rival 
nations; and many seek them to guarantee national sovereignty. North Korea’s (DPRK) 
road to acquiring nuclear weapons coincides with its desire to maintain national 
sovereignty. The DPRK’s leadership under the Kim family (Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, 
and Kim Jong Un) used nuclear weapons as a tool to balance stronger powers and prevent 
outside powers from toppling their regime. Pursuit of nuclear weapons began shortly 
after North Korea’s emergence during the 1950s, and accelerated throughout the latter 
half of the 20th century.1 North Korea had numerous motivations for attempting to gain 
nuclear weapons including: assisting the Soviet Union with countering American power, 
combating the economic influence of South Korea, and hedging against American 
nuclear technology.2  
In conjunction with motivation, historians and policy-makers should ask, how 
could North Korea have obtained nuclear weapons under international community’s 
watch? There any indicators pointing towards North Korea’s tactics? In order to answer 
these questions, one must look at the history of North Korea’s path towards achieving 
nuclear weapons, assess the U.S. perspective, and provide recommendations for 
countering the nuclear ambitions of other state actors. The nuclear situation with North 
                                                 
1  Ramesh C, Thakur, Nuclear Weapons and International Security, (London: Routledge. 2015), 
143.  
2 Ibid. 
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Korea is a nuanced topic; full of pitfalls, media landmines, and misunderstandings. Each 
administration handling the Kim regime understood the complexity of the North Korea 
situation. Unfortunately, there are not sure-fire answers to such problems, but there can 
be solutions which may deliver adequate results.  
 This paper explores U.S. efforts in Bill Clinton’s presidency to prevent North 
Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons; while providing recommendations in three 
distinct sections. The first section outlines the history of North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program, briefly examining North Korea’s motivations since 1951, and then focusing on 
1991-2000. Presidential statements, newspaper articles, and foreign policy actions 
provide the basis for assessing America’s conception of the crisis. The second section 
evaluates the Clinton administrations negotiation tactics. Finally, the third section will 
offer policy recommendations for foreign policy analysts dealing with North Korea in 
future meetings.  
North Korea’s Nuclear Story 
 North Korea’s decision to use nuclear weapons as a way to preserve its national 
sovereignty began soon after the Korean War. North Korea required large amounts of 
assistance from the Communist states of Russia and China throughout its nuclear journey. 
However, North Korean ingenuity, military focus, and self-reliance were also critical 
factors influencing its nuclear weapons program.3 Beginning in the mid-1950s North 
Korea’s leader, Kim Il Sung, initiated his nation’s nuclear program for a few reasons. 
                                                 
3 Walter C., Clemens, Jr, "North Korea's Quest for Nuclear Weapons: New Historical Evidence," 
Journal of East Asian Studies 10, no. 1 (2010): 127. 
Nuclear Program and Negotiation 
 
6 
Primarily, he wanted to counter United States nuclear threats while also gaining 
international collaboration. 
  In 1964, Kim approached Communist China for information on how to create a 
nuclear weapon.4 Unfortunately for Kim, Chinese leader, Mao Zedong, declined his 
request. Without Chinese assistance, Kim approached Russian officials for nuclear 
technology. Kim believed Russia could provide the necessary resources to assist in his 
nuclear ambitions, and Russian officials also had deep ties to the North Korean 
government. As far back as 1948, Joseph Stalin communicated with Kim Il Sung to open 
up diplomatic relations with North Korea.5 Russian-DPRK ties continued to improve in 
the 1950s, and economic cooperation grew. In the late 1950s, USSR-DPRK trade 
involved economic agreements and resource distribution.6 In 1965, Russia sold a research 
reactor to Pyongyang. Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyky described how the 
USSR would be willing to further assist North Korea with its nuclear ambitions.7 This 
would be accomplished through scientific education programs including “on-the-spot 
training.”8 This training would provide North Korean nuclear scientists with hands on 
                                                 
 4 Ford, Glyn, and Soyoung Kwon, North Korea On the Brink: Struggle For Survival, (London; 
Ann Arbor, Mich: Pluto Press, 2008), 149.  
5 "Telegram from Stalin to Kim Il Sung," October 12, 1948, History and Public Policy Program 
Digital Archive, CWIHP archive, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119377 
6 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 24 July 1957," July 24, 1957, 
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F. 0102, Op. 13, P. 72, Delo 5, Listy 146-164. 
Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115637; and 
"Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 1 October 1957," October 01, 1957, 
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F. 0102, Op. 13, Delo 5, Listy 257-307. 
Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115933 
7 "From the Journal of Gromyko, Record of a Conversation with Ambassador Ri Sin-Pal of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea," April 28, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
Archive, AVPRF fond 0102, opis 14, delo 4, p. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg, 
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116019 
 8 Ford, North Korea on the Brink, 149-151. 
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experience in how to use nuclear reactor and refine nuclear material. The next decade 
witnessed North Korea expanding beyond Russian assistance, by moving scientists into 
education programs throughout Japan, the United States, and Germany.9  
Over the next twenty years, North Korea reached numerous nuclear milestones 
through strategy and deception. In 1985, Kim strategically joined the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in order receive additional nuclear power stations for peaceful 
purposes from the Soviet Union.10These power stations would provide Kim with nuclear 
power while also avoiding international scrutiny. 1986 was a crucial turning-point in 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, when it built a reactor capable of producing 
weapons grade plutonium.11 Even though Russian influence provided North Korea with 
the material necessary to produce reactor’s of military capability, the DPRK also 
capitalized on investing its educational resources. Such investment included establishing 
scientific research in countries with nuclear knowledge and gaining training from Russian 
scientists. 
1991: A Turning Point in the Nuclear Chess Game 
 North Korea lost a few crucial benefits with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
including its technological support. The Soviet Union’s fall also prevented Russia from 
providing the nuclear power center’s promised with the DPRK’s compliance with the 
NPT. This made the DPRK begin to re-consider the NPT agreement which gave it access 
Russian assistance. Kim also may have questioned the survival of his regime, after 
                                                 
 9 Ibid, 149-151. 
10 Tim Beal, North Korea: The Struggle Against American Power, (London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto 
Press, 2005), 67. 
 11 Ford, North Korea on the Brink, 149. 
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dozens of other communist nations began to fall around him.12 As uncertainty mounted, 
Kim again looked to China for economic and technological assistance. Instead of denying 
North Korea’s requests, China decided to provide aid to the DPRK in order to establish a 
buffer against American influence. Throughout the 1990s, 70% of the DPRK’s food and 
oil came from China, and trade would only increase going into the 21st century.13 
Increased trade with China allowed North Korea to avoid the impact of American 
economic pressure throughout the 1990s, and it also provided a way for Kim Jong Il to 
invest into military spending. Without Chinese assistance, American sanctions and 
resource embargos would have created increased hardship for Kim. Economic 
uncertainty was not the only problem facing the Kim regime in the 1990s. Kim Il Sung 
was also preoccupied with training an heir in his son, Kim Jong Il.14  
In the early 1990s, North Korea experienced a period of national uncertainty, 
increased American expansion, and a transition of power. 1991 not only signaled the fall 
of the Soviet Union, but it also coincided with North Korea accepting nuclear weapons 
inspectors. For years the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) wanted North 
Korea to comply with its nuclear safeguards.15 Kim Il Sung repeatedly avoided the 
IAEA’s calls for inspection until 1991, when South Korean president, Roh Tae Wooh, 
declared the non-existence of nuclear warheads in South Korea.16 With the knowledge 
that nuclear weapons were not present in South Korea Kim shifted his policy and opened 
                                                 
 12  Joel S. Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean 
Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 5. 
 13 Mark Haichin,"Pragmatic, Not Mad: The Rationality of North Korea's Nuclear Weapons 
Program," Journal Of Military & Strategic Studies 18, no. 1 (April 2017): 153. 
 14 Wit, Going Critical, 5. 
 15 Ibid, 8. 
 16 Ibid. 
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the door for weapons inspectors. The George H.W. Bush administration also promised 
North Korean diplomats a meeting with a high-level American diplomat if IAEA 
inspection standards were met.17 With this knowledge, Kim Il Sung decided to accept 
inspection standards in order to, “drive a wedge between the United States and South 
Korea” through a bilateral meeting with an American diplomat.18 A bilateral meeting 
would push South Korean diplomats out of the negotiation proceedings, and hopefully 
(for the DPRK) gain influence with America. He also agreed to sign a denuclearization 
agreement with the South Korea in an attempt to delay international suspicion.19 The 
agreement required a commitment by both sides to remove any nuclear weaponry from 
the peninsula and promote “conditions favorable for peace.”20 Key components of the 
agreement included: using nuclear material for peaceful purposes, not establishing 
nuclear enrichment facilities, and not possessing or storing nuclear weapons.21 It also 
called for North Korea to accept inspections of its nuclear facilities. Initially, the 
agreement was seen as a beneficial step towards de-escalation; however, the DPRK 
would shortly change its mind. 
1992-1995: Frameworks, Ambiguity, and Deception 
 North Korea’s desire for nuclear weapons fully began at the end of 1992. 
Throughout the last half of the 20th century, North Korea gained nuclear knowledge from 
all across the world; however, finding global alliances remained difficult. Kim Il Sung 
                                                 
17 Ibid, 10-11.  
18 Ibid, 11. 
 19 Ibid. 
20 Shik, Chong W., and Yon Hyong-Muk. "Joint Declaration of South And North Korea On The 
Denuclearization Of The Korean Peninsula." Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Accessed November 6, 
2018. https://www.nti.org/media/documents/korea_denuclearization.pdf. 
21 Ibid. 
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found a necessary partner in Pakistan moving into 1993. A meeting between the premier 
of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, and Kim resulted in missile designs changing hands.22 
Ultimately, this partnership would evolve into a nuclear deal providing North Korea 
uranium enrichment capabilities in exchange for missile technology to Pakistan in 1996.23  
George H. W. Bush attempted to pursue productive dialogue late in his 
administration; however, the North Korea situation was becoming much more complex 
than originally anticipated. Throughout 1991, Bush would focus on a “dual-track” 
approach to negotiations, where military action was “taken off the table.” Bush attempted 
to bring North Korea towards productive negotiations, while also attempting to “tighten 
the noose” on Kim through sanctions.24 The State Department also prioritized North 
Korea and called for “maximum diplomatic effort” to halt the North’s nuclear 
advancement.25 These efforts included finding a way to administer IAEA inspections, 
calling on allies to limit economic aid, and preventing nuclear proliferation.26 As a 
prerequisite for talks, the Bush administration also pulled all its tactical warheads out of 
the Korean Peninsula.27Numerous other talks with Japan, South Korea, and China would 
attempt to establish momentum going forward.  
                                                 
22 Niv Farago, "Washington's Failure to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Conundrum: 
Examining Two Decades of US policy." International Affairs 92, no. 5 (September 2016): 1130-1131. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Robert Wambler, “Engaging North Korea: Evidence from the Bush I Administration,” National 
Security Archive, November 8, 2017, accessed on November 6, 2018, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-
book/korea-nuclear-vault/2017-11-08/bush-43-chose-diplomacy-over-military-force-north-korea.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid. 
27 David E. Rosenbaum, "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 24 July 
1957,” New York Times, October 20, 1994.  
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From an outsider’s perspective talks seemed to be making progress. However, 
newly elected President Bill Clinton would be given a situation which was headed 
towards tension. By the end of 1992, talks with North Korean officials became difficult, 
and were characterized as “painful, lengthy, and arduous.”28 Even with the rising threat of 
North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, the Clinton administration’s nuclear policy appeared 
uninterested in a few ways. President Clinton inherited many foreign policy fires with, 
“Bosnia and Russia howling the loudest.”29 In this context, North Korea was not as 
important as dealing with the Soviet Union breaking apart, or with Bosnia’s ethnic 
conflict. The American people were also uninterested in foreign policy, and the Clinton 
administration decided not to outline the importance of foreign policy to the public.30 
Meetings to discuss nuclear diplomacy only occurred three times for the entirety of 
1993.31 The Clinton administration assigned the Assistant Secretary of State, Robert 
Gallucci, to begin diplomatic talks towards limiting North Korea’s nuclear program.32  
 Initial re-engagement began poorly. A spy scandal and an announcement to 
resume US-ROK military exercises, code named Team Spirit, in 1993 iced any 
cooperation between North and South Korea.33 In fact, newly transitioned leader of North 
Korea, Kim Jong Il, declared a state of war readiness after the exercises commenced on 
                                                 
 28 Robert Cain and John W. Lewis, "Negotiating with North Korea," Center for International 
Security and Cooperation (January 2008), 4. 
29 Bill, Clinton, My Life. (New York: Alfred A. Knope, 2004), 502. 
30 Riley, Russell L. Riley, Inside the Clinton White House, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2016) 77. 
 31 Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea, (Princeton 
University Press, 1998) 53.  
 32 Ibid, 53.  
 33 Ibid. 
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March 8, 1993.34 This transition became cemented before Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994; 
however, Kim Il Sung decided to slowly transition power over to Kim Jong Il for national 
stability purposes. Clinton also had to deal with war hawks and proponents of economic 
sanctions. When faced with all the options, Clinton had to choose between diplomatic 
probes, sanctions, war, or air-strikes.35 Clinton chose a diplomatic probe, due to the lack 
of popularity war would have with an American people weary from military conflict in 
the Baltic states and the Middle East.36 Increased military tension also coincided with 
increased IAEA pressure. Demands for special inspections to determine the extent of 
North Korea’s nuclear program were increasing, and Kim did not want to abide by the 
special procedures outlined under the IAEA.37 Therefore, Kim Jong Il decided to pull 
North Korea out of the NPT on March 12, 1993. Global criticism ensued, with American, 
South Korean , and Chinese officials calling for North Korea to back down and use 
diplomacy.38 Ultimately, international condemnation and American pressure prevented 
North Korea from leaving the NPT; however, North Korea’s actions were foreshadows of 
what was to come.39 
  In order to prevent North Korea from leaving the NPT in the future, U.S. officials 
decided to pursue increased negotiations. A series of bilateral talks were implemented 
                                                 
 34 Narushige Michishita, North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns,1966-2008, (London: 
Routledge, 2010) 94. 
35 Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea, 53. 
36 Ibid. 
 37 Ibid.  
 38 Ibid, 94.  
39 Kelsey, Davenport, "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," Arms 
Control Association, Accessed November 6, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron, 
accessed November 15, 2018. 
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between 1993 and early 1994, setting the precedent for talks towards agreed framework 
negotiations in late 1994. By the time the United States realized the extent of North 
Korea’s nuclear ambitions, Kim Jong Il had already acquired the necessary scientific 
information and nuclear material needed to create a bomb. In early 1994, American 
officials continued to believe North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability could be blunted. 
President Clinton declared that his goal was to, “"help achieve a longstanding and vital 
American objective -- an end to the threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean 
Peninsula."40 Kim’s plan did not coincide with Clinton’s hopes, and behind closed doors 
Secretary of Defense William Perry provided information of Korea’s plans to re-process 
its reactor fuel to create plutonium.41  
 Perry was worried North Korea could possess enough plutonium to create “six or 
seven nuclear bombs,” and he wanted Clinton to understand the gravity of a nuclear 
North Korea.42 Armed conflict became more of a possibility, as Clinton had to balance 
threatening North Korea while avoiding being overly aggressive. In light of this balance, 
Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher, developed  a plan to implement more 
sanctions, and increase American troop presence in South Korea by 20-30,000 troops.43 It 
appeared as if America was headed in the direction of war rather than peace. However, 
there was a potential solution through the interaction between former President Jimmy 
Carter and a dying Kim Il Sung in June of 1994. Over the last few months, Kim wanted a 
                                                 
40Sanger, David E. "Clinton Approves a Plan to Give Aid to North Koreans." New York Times, 
October 19, 1994. 
41 Russell, “Inside the Clinton White House,"258.  
42Sanger, “Clinton Approves a Plan to Give Aid to North Koreans.”; Russell, “Inside the Clinton 
White House,” 259. 
43 Ibid 
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meeting with an American politician, and Carter decided to make the trip to North Korea 
in order to find room for compromise.44 Carter’s visit provided Clinton with the 
knowledge Pyongyang was willing to give up its reactor in Yongbyon in exchange for 
light water reactors.45 Additionally, Carter’s impact on Kim Il Sung before his death 
changed North Korea’s decision to not resume operations of its nuclear reactors.46 
Without a relational interaction with Pyongyang diplomats, Clinton and Kim Jong Il may 
have traveled down the path of war instead of diplomacy, as sanctions and an increased 
troop presence created a higher risk of conflict. Instead, Clinton agreed to talk with Kim 
Jong Il at the Geneva summit in late 1994 and, as a gesture of goodwill, the United States 
dropped sanctions untill the meeting.47 Unfortunately, Kim Il Sung passed away in July 
of 1994 throwing the future of negotiations in doubt.48 Without his father’s influence, 
Kim Jong Il’s ascension to power in 1993 caused fear for American negotiators, due to 
their lack of understanding of how Kim Jong Il would pursue nuclear weapons. A more 
nuclear North Korea could cause other nations (Japan and South Korea) to follow suit.49  
Japan and the United States would resolve the issue at the 1994 G7 Summit in Naples, 
when Japan’s prime minister, Tomiichi Murayama, agreed to maintain solidarity with 
America in regards to the North Korean situation. However, the main question of North 
Korea’s position would still remain, moving into the latter half of 1994 and 1995.  
                                                 
44 Russell, “Inside the Clinton White House,” 259.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Clinton, “My Life,” 603. 
48 Ibid.,” 608. 
49 Ibid. 
Nuclear Program and Negotiation 
 
15 
 1994 marked the initiation of an agreed framework to halt North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program. This framework would be repeatedly broken, and it was partially due 
to North Korea achieving its diplomatic agenda. A key component of North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons diplomacy involves its ambiguous definition of terms. Ambiguous 
definitions became more prevalent as negotiations continued in 1994. The United States 
and North Korea agreed to bilateral discussions; however, the United States included a 
few caveats. First, North Korea would need to accept “ad-hoc inspections” of key nuclear 
facilities. Second, North Korea would also need to resume negotiations with ROK 
officials.50 U.S. officials also agreed to compromise as well. Talks would begin to relieve 
sanctions on North Korea and get rid of military exercises.51 Negotiations initially 
showed promise but went downhill after North Korea defined “ad hoc inspections” 
differently than U.S. officials.52 North Korea’s inspections would involve nuclear testing 
facilities which did not contain the capacity to enrich military grade uranium. Kim 
defined denuclearization differently as well. North Korea only agreed to move back into 
the NPT if the United States promised to de-nuclearize completely.53 A lack of universal 
definitions clogged down the diplomatic process, and allowed Kim to continue 
production of weapons grade plutonium.  
 Another aspect of North Korean negotiation policy was the use of  pacing to hold 
meetings on their terms.54 Kim’s regime would make strategic decisions on issues which 
                                                 
 50 Michishita, North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 98. 
 51 Ibid. 
 52 Ibid. 
 53 Ibid. 
54 Cain, “Negotiating with North Korea.” 
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did not require critical U.S. involvement. Once the U.S. bogged itself down attempting to 
debate military drills, economic issues, or alliance structures, North Korea would prolong 
negotiations to buy time. One reason for the tactics effectiveness revolved around the 
U.S. perception of the Kim regime. The U.S. treated North Korea primarily as a strategic 
concern rather than attempting to listen to Kim’s domestic and economic concerns (i.e. 
food, money, and energy).55 Strategically North Korea was seen as a nuclear threat and 
nothing more; however, Kim desired to engage in negotiations as an equal and leader in 
need of revenue. The DPRK would also delay negotiations, over excuses of bureaucratic 
transition which would bog down any hope of productive dialogue.56  
 Even with ambiguous definitions and delay tactics, the United States and the 
DPRK signed a framework in October 1994. The DPRK would open its borders for 
IAEA inspections to occur.57 In return, the United States agreed to provide 500,000 tons 
of fuel oil shipments to the DPRK every year. The DPRK would also receive two light-
water nuclear reactors, which would not be able to produce weapons grade material.58 
The signing of the framework excited policy officials, who spent years fighting to gain 
the opportunity to a peaceful resolution of the crisis.59 Clinton called the agreement, “a 
good deal,” and the U.N. declared that the deal ended the North Korean nuclear 
problem.60 President Bill Clinton declared the agreement would be a major step towards 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
 57 Wit, Going Critical, 275. 
 58 Ibid. 
 59 Ibid, 332.  
60 Alan Riding, "U.S. and North Korea Sign Pact to End Nuclear Dispute," New York Times, 
October 22, 1994; "U.N. Says North Korea Halted Nuclear Program." New York Times (1923-Current 
File), Nov 29, 1994. 
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ending the threat of nuclear proliferation on the peninsula.61 He also believed the 
agreement to be, “a tribute” to past administrations who were unable to fully gain North 
Korean compliance. Clinton would maintain the effectiveness of the agreement even after 
it was broken in 1998, highlighting how North Korea would have developed even more 
nuclear material if the agreement was not in place.62  
 The agreement revolved around a few key components. First, the United States 
agreed to provide the DPRK with a light water reactor (LWR), which could promote the 
use of peaceful nuclear energy.63 In return, the DPRK would halt the usage of its graphite 
reactors, thereby preventing weapons-grade plutonium production. 64  If both parties 
abided by their stipulations, each nation would upgrade its diplomatic status to 
negotiations on a bilateral level.65 However, 1995 saw increasing moves by North Korea 
to continue its pursuit of nuclear material. A divided international arena, slippery 
definitions, and a torn American political climate allowed Kim Jong Il to avoid many of 
the stipulations the framework outlined. The framework formulated by the United States 
and North Korea involved more than nonproliferation. North Korea desired diplomatic, 
economic, and relational ties with the US government in order to attain resources and 
security.66 North Korea wanted to use talks as a precursor for increased political 
relationships, and the framework eventually became the foundational element of North 
                                                 
61 William J Clinton, "Remarks on North Korea with Reporters," Speech, Government Publishing 
Office, 1993, “ 
62 Clinton, “My Life,” 625.  
63 Bureau of Arms Control, "Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea," October 22, 1994.  
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
 66 Cain, “Negotiating with North Korea.” 
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Korea’s diplomatic negotiation strategy moving into the 21st century.67 However, 
understanding North Korea’s true intentions has been difficult for other American 
governments, and the Clinton administration was no different. A lack of understanding 
ultimately led to both sides reversing key promises of the agreement in 1994.  
 Unfortunately, the 1994 agreement did not come to fruition in good faith.68 
Instead, America signed the agreement with the hope North Korea would collapse 
similarly to the Soviet Union in 1991.69 When North Korea survived famine, economic 
instability, and external pressure, and remained a key presence in the region, American 
officials were surprised.70 Unfortunately, American surprise led to a lack of follow-
through in regards to the 1994 agreement. Sanctions were not lifted, and the light water 
reactor projects proceeded behind schedule and without motivation.71 President Clinton 
did come out and declare the light-water reactors would be provided through South 
Korean channels; however, US officials dragged their feet to provide the reactors to the 
DPRK.72 Additionally, Clinton lost the House of Representatives in the 1994 mid-term 
elections, and Republicans cut funding for the projects outlined in the framework.73 For 
US-DPRK relations, the late 1990s produced a series of difficult unproductive talking 
points leading to dilemmas in the 21st century.  
1996-2000: Worsening Ties and Failed Negotiations 
                                                 
 67 Ibid. 
 68 Ford, North Korea on the Brink, 152. 
 69 Ibid, 152-155. 
 70 Ibid. 
 71 Ibid. 
72 William J. Clinton, "Remarks on the Situation in North Korea and an Exchange With 
Reporters," Speech, Government Publishing Organization, 1993. 
 73 Ford, North Korea on the Brink, 153. 
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 The next step in North Korea’s nuclear journey began with a series of negotiation 
attempts in the late 1990s. 1996 produced a series of dialogues involving China, North 
Korea, South Korea, and the United States.74 This series of “four party talks” also 
coincided with US-North Korea missile talks.75 The four party talks began with the intent 
to discuss a replacement for the armistice ending the Korean War in 1953. Further, 
Clinton also wanted to see if North Korea’s calls for peace were serious.76 U.S. officials 
desired an ability to talk to North Korean officials about “peace-related issues.”77 Peace-
related issues involved discussions concerning weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
the placement of military forces on the peninsula. Kim’s regime understood the 
importance of holding talks with powers capable of providing strategic resources and 
agreed to the talks on the precondition the DPRK would receive food aid and eased 
economic sanctions. South Korean President, Kim Young-sam responded in a 
conciliatory manner,.Chinese, Japanese, and American perspectives were all positive 
towards the talks; unfortunately, six rounds of talks between 1996-1999 produced little 
progress towards achieving denuclearization of the peninsula.78 
 Key problems plagued the four party talks from the beginning. First, Kim Jong 
Il’s regime did not budge from its two objectives: US troop removal from the peninsula 
and obtaining a peace treaty between North and South Korea.79 When these objectives 
were not met, North Korea backed out of the negotiations. However, North Korea was 
                                                 
 74  S.H. Joo,  Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian Security 
Cooperation, (London: Routledge. 2010) 18-20. 
 75 Cain, “Negotiating with North Korea.” 
76 Clinton, “My Life,” 707. 
 77 Joo, Peace Regime Building, 18-20. 
 78 Ibid. 
 79 Ibid, 18-20. 
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not be able to break down the solidarity South Korea, Japan, and China maintained with 
the United States. Clinton supported South Korean president, Kim Dae Jung, in his 
attempt to prevent North Korean nuclear proliferation. Clinton also found common 
ground with Japan’s new prime minister, Keizo Obuchi.80 When the first talk convened in 
August 5-7, 1997 China, America, South Korea did not want to move from their stated 
objectives of denuclearization; however, the DPRK did not budge from their conditions 
either. This resulted in deadlock and limited success.  
 Five future meetings took place under the four party model. Each produced the 
same level of deadlock and limited success. Each talk was disjointed, hard to manage, 
and difficult to sustain for a long period of time. These failures were not a result of 
American failure, but rather an unwillingness on North Korea’s part to negotiate. With 
each set of talks, Kim Jong Il continued to push away cooperation, and called for China 
to be removed from the negotiations.81 North Korea also went to each negotiation hoping 
to gain economic and diplomatic benefits. Four party negotiations stunted Kim’s policy 
goals of placing negotiations between only the United States and the DPRK.82 With 
bilateral negotiations, Kim hoped to gain economic concessions from America, which 
would not be attainable in a four-party setting. 83 In a time of deteriorating attitudes 
between South and North Korea, the four party talks were a way to promote diplomatic 
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over military options, and they “proved to be a training ground…to avoid crisis over the 
North Korea nuclear issue.”84 
 The other series of talks taking place in the late 1990s were the bilateral missile 
discussions between the U.S. and DPRK.85 In April 1996, U.S. and DPRK officials met 
to discuss missile diplomacy. DPRK officials went into the discussion with a serious 
desire to make America compromise on allowing missile testing.86 However, the United 
States entered the negotiations with a lax timeline and little desire to entertain the 
DPRK’s proposals.87 Two events during the end of the 1990s changed this attitude. In the 
fall of 1996, America forced North Korean to comply with the agreed framework of 
1994, and effectively stopped North Korea from initiating a missile test. It would take 
two years before Kim effectively tested a missile at the Taepodong reactor.88 This test 
sparked a flurry of activity in the U.S. government. In order to talk back North Korean 
missile activity, the U.S. initiated bilateral negotiations in Berlin during the Summer of 
1999.89  
These talks resulted in North Korea forgoing long-range missile testing in 
exchange for a relaxation of sanctions. Initially, this appeared to solve a few problems for 
the U.S. Not only would North Korea halt long-range missile testing, but it would also be 
provided much needed economic assistance. Other promising events occurred in early 
2000, which made it appear as if Kim Jong Il would comply with U.S. requests. One such 
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event was the first ever North-South Korean summit. During the summit Kim Jong Il and 
Kim Dae-Jung agreed to re-unite Korean family members and work towards re-
unification.90 For the United States this appeared to cement their idea that North Korea 
was working towards peace rather than tension. With the North-South Korea summit an 
apparent success, Clinton attempted to initiate additional bilateral talks at the end of 
2000. Unfortunately, these talks fell apart after a series of disjointed negotiations and a 
repeated lack of DPRK compliance. North Korea came to the 2000 negotiations with a 
request of $1 billion and a relaxation of economic sanctions in exchange for halting its 
missile exports to rogue nations states like Iran.91 U.S. officials rejected this proposal but 
did not re-enact sanctions or decry human rights abuses.92 
 There were numerous issues which plagued the talks from their initiation. First, 
both the DPRK and the United States experienced problems over the significance of the 
situation. Many leaders of the DPRK foreign ministry did not conclude missile talks to be 
a productive objective of Korean foreign policy. On the other hand, U.S. officials did not 
view the DPRK’s missile program as a high strategic concern; therefore, bilateral talks 
usually resulted in repeated talking points, and similar patterns of development.93 
Secondly, defining the terms of negotiation remained a key problem reminiscent of past 
conversations with the DPRK’s diplomatic team.94 Finally, the United States brought 
different teams of experts to each new series of talks; whereas the North Korean 
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delegation provided consistency in who they sent to negotiate.95 Without the benefit of 
similar faces, American officials would sometimes be unfamiliar with the over-arching 
theme of the negotiation proceedings.96 
 President Clinton left office with the potential for a serious crisis. North Korea’s 
missile program continued to push the limits of international norms. The agreed 
framework, though initially praised, began to fall apart as North Korea avoided 
inspections, and the United States did not fulfill the promises of lifted sanctions. By 
2002, the agreed framework was declared dead by both America and North Korean 
diplomats. In 2003, North Korea pulled out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.97 A 
greater travesty occurred in 2006, when North Korea detonated two nuclear devices, 
along with another in 2009.98 The Clinton administration is not wholly to blame for the 
difficulty they faced in negotiating with North Korea. The administration used the 
diplomatic tools which had worked for past administrations in dealing with other rogue 
nation-states. Unfortunately, it is hard to negotiate with a nation willing to sacrifice 
resources in exchange for access onto the nuclear arena. Therefore, when one looks at the 
beginnings of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, lessons can be learned from a 
diplomatic, strategic, and political standpoint in order to obtain a better understanding of 
the present Kim regime.  
Diplomatic, Political, and Strategic Lessons  
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Diplomatic Lessons 
Diplomatically, the United States made many errors in negotiating with the North 
Korean government between 1989-2000. When negotiating with North Korea, the United  
States bowed to the desires of the North Korean regime to host bilateral talks in addition 
to multi-lateral ones.99 The bilateral agreed framework, the missile talks, and the shift 
away from the Four-Party talks, point towards a North Korean strategy of separating the 
United States from its Asian partners. North Korean officials accomplished separation in 
ways other than negotiations. When the U.S. restarted military exercises in 1993 North 
Korea backed away from the negotiation table, in an attempt to break apart a renewed 
South Korean-U.S. relationship.100 When North Korea works with China, Japan, or the 
United States in separate corners it promotes confusion, and it prolongs negotiations. 
Each nation does have differing strategic interests; however, the U.S.’s goal should be to 
enact universal sanctions. Universal sanctions would entail getting nation-states to 
maintain continuous pressure on the DPRK economically. In order to do so, the U.S. 
needs to negotiate with actors who have a history of providing assistance to North Korea 
(Russia and China). If either of these nations circumvent enacting sanctions in private 
one-on-one meetings, effective diplomacy will be blunted. 
North Korea also went into each negotiation promoting their agenda and forced 
concessions before the talks began.101 Kim would do this by, “conditioning [his] return 
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on receiving preliminary concessions from [his] opponents.”102 When viewing 
negotiation proceedings through this lens, the 1990s promoted getting North Korea to the 
table, even if that meant giving gifts before the talks began. The Four-Party talks offered 
promises of reduced sanctions, increased trade, and gifts of natural resources.103 North 
Korea would then use those gifts as leverage to attempt to ask for more gifts. 
Unfortunately, pre-conditions set up a system which pro-longed a regime surviving on 
foreign resources to maintain its military and economics.  
 Western diplomacy and Korean diplomacy are a object lesson in differing 
cultures. America has had trouble understanding Korea’s style of diplomacy even into the 
21st century. For Korean negotiators, “a negotiated deal is impossible without personal 
bonds between the negotiators.”104 In contrast, Americans tend to, “ focus on the bottom 
line and on abstract rules and laws, with little regard for cultural sensitivities and 
diplomatic niceties.”105 Negotiations will result in failure if no change of perspective is 
made. In the face of the constantly changing teams of American negotiators, Asian style 
diplomacy would suffer in attempting to build relationships with new faces at every 
meeting. Additionally, American diplomacy is more inclined towards quick resolution, 
whereas Asian style diplomacy caters towards prolonged discussion. 
 In the 1990s, America and Korea established a precedent of diplomatic 
misunderstanding. DPRK negotiators also borrowed negotiation tactics from Russia. 
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These tactics involved, “wear[ing] down their opponents by bidding high, persevering, 
backtracking, repeating, and making only token concessions. At Pan-munjom and 
elsewhere. North Korean diplomats have often practiced brinksmanship.”106. Therefore, 
the United States made numerous errors throughout its negotiations with North Korea 
throughout the 1990s. These errors included: allowing North Korea to spilt multilateral 
discussion into bilateral talks, and delay negotiations for prolonged periods of time.  
Political Lessons 
Political lessons can be learned from the negotiations of the 1990s. After the 
agreed framework in 1994, Congress and the president produced differing attitudes 
towards the relationship with North Korea.107 On the Congressional level, many 
representatives did not want to fall in line with Clinton’s policy on North Korea due to 
the fiscal costs involved. Congressional funding for the framework did not meet the 
obligations promised by the administration. A Republican House continually avoided 
providing the oil shipments promised to Kim.108 When oil resources did not arrive as 
anticipated it harmed the integrity of Clinton’s promises, by causing North Korea to 
doubt the U.S.’s commitment. In reaction to Congress, Clinton had to explain that the 
DPRK’s promises would be fulfilled, even when the promises implementation was 
behind schedule.109 An example of this can be found in the construction of North Korean 
light-water reactors. The framework indicated that the U.S. would provide the funding 
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and resources for two light-water reactors in North Korea. However, it would take years 
of delay, and Clinton was unable to construct them during his term.110 In fact, the light 
water reactor project authorized by the agreement ended up being five years behind 
schedule.111 Unfulfilled promises led to North Korea finding a reason to re-start uranium 
enrichment.112 The blame for the delay does not fall on Clinton’s administration, but on 
the lack of funding provided to give oil resources in fulfillment of the agreed framework. 
Not providing oil and hindering funding for the construction of the LWR’s did not 
promote American integrity in the eyes of North Korean diplomats. Instead, it would 
have been better to progress with achievable goals, rather than make unfulfillable 
promises.   
 Politically, North Korea appears to follow a policy of harsh language, combined 
with charm offensives when diplomats overstep their bounds.113 America maintained 
sanctions throughout most of the 1990s; however, they sometimes limited sanctions in 
favor of a settlement. The Agreed Framework of 1994 is a prime example of this. Instead 
of continually placing pressure on North Korea, America diminished its previously harsh 
negotiation policy, and exchanged it for a more diplomatic one.114 American sanction 
policy after the Agreed Framework did not seem to limit North Korean expansion, 
because of North Korea maintained a conciliatory policy; therefore, two lessons can be 
gleaned from the United States interactions with North Korea throughout the 1990s and 
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early 2000s. First, an atmosphere of trust must be built in order to progress towards 
successful foreign policy. Trust could possibly be gained by developing interpersonal 
relationships with North Korean diplomats. Instead of sending different diplomatic teams 
during each series of talks, America should treat diplomacy with North Korea as a 
relationship and not a business transaction. This can be difficult; however, small steps 
towards rebuilding trust need to be made in order to witness genuine change. Second, 
America should be wary of North Korea’s continually shifting foreign policy, by 
maintaining an attitude of consistency. 
 Consistency could be drawn in two directions. First, the U.S. could embrace an 
attitude of continued pressure, and vie for international sanctions to remain in place, even 
while negotiations are taking place. Sanctions would only be lifted if North Korea 
complies with nuclear non-proliferation guidelines. By maintaining consistent pressure, 
the United States would cause North Korea to suffocate economically. Economic 
suffocation would then lead to concessions at the negotiation table. There are a few 
caveats to this approach. First, China and Russia need to be on board with the U.S. 
policy. America could approach this situation by catering to Russia and China’s desire for 
power, by revealing how a nuclear armed North Korea equates to a uncontrollable nation-
state. A second approach would be the opposite. America could work with international 
actors to provide economic support to Kim’s regime, relax sanctions, and attempt to 
physically negotiate with North Korean officials. A de-escalatory approach would 
hopefully open North Korea to outside influence, and cause regime change from the 
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inside. However, if the United States flip-flops between these two scenarios it creates 
confusion at the negotiation table, and prevents effective steps towards progress.  
Strategic Lessons 
 Strategically, American policy officials can see the initial rationale for North 
Korea’s nuclear program, by looking to Korean policy from 1955-2000. North Korea 
uses its nuclear program primarily to counter American influence, survive American 
pressure, and shape negotiations. In order to counter America’s influence, Kim Jong Il 
promoted the establishment of a “military-first ideology as a primary banner for 
describing the revised institutional, political, and social order within North Korea.”115 
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are founded in order to maintain this order, and to keep 
Korea’s domestic population submissive.116 From its creation, North Korea experienced 
numerous points of  conflict with the United States in terms of ideology and 
economics.117 North Korea promoted terrorism against South Korean civilians, 
antagonized American policy-makers, and attempted to pit Japan and South Korea 
against each other. 118 One may look at these actions, and conclude North Korea was 
advocating for provocation over survival. One sees a different story when looking at the 
bigger picture. North Korea’s neighbors hold significant economic, technological, and 
military advantages, which Kim’s regime could not overcome.119 In the 1970s, Kim Il 
Sung promoted a policy of focusing on a nuclear deterrent as a primary policy goal in 
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order to promote regime survival.120 A military first approach allowed North Korea to 
ward off external threats and gain a seat at the table of larger powers. The Soviet Union 
became the initial donor to promoting North Korean survival; however, after the USSR’s 
fall, American, and Chinese, aid helped fill the hole which was left behind.121 When one 
looks at the relationship North Korea has with outside nations they can see North Korea’s 
strategy is about survival over provocation. The Kim regime has historically done 
anything possible to maintain survival, even if that means developing a nuclear warhead. 
 History seemed to point Kim Jong Il towards a nuclear deterrent in the face of 
American power. Rogue nations without weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) 
experienced regime change by American military force including nations like Libya, 
Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It is almost a certainty that Kim’s regime looked to the First 
Gulf War in 1991, as an example of what happens to an enemy of the United States when 
a WMDs are not present.122 Iraq’s regime was taken out in a matter of weeks when a 
nuclear deterrent was not present.  Ultimately, maintaining possession of nuclear 
weapons prevents external threats America has imposed upon other nations. When 
deterrents are present, military action is not as easily deployed, and the United States can 
resort to other measures.123  
Policy Implications for the Current Administration 
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History is an important instructor for policy analysis in the modern day. President 
Donald Trump’s administration should implement key diplomatic, and strategic 
recommendations in order to effectively promote freedom in a globalizing world.  
 One of the primary issues discovered in negotiating with North Korea is the 
attempt to establish pre-conditions to a meeting. Many times, preconditions promote 
hardline stances, without any desire for peace when talks begin; therefore, both the 
United States and the DPRK must throw away their initial objectives and enter into 
diplomacy with an open mind. 124  Unfortunately, this recommendation is easier written 
than accomplished. But if the United States wants to rectify decades of sown distrust it 
must take the lead and establish that any attempt to establish pre-conditions will cancel 
negotiation proceedings. When America avoids promising relaxed sanctions, re-
unification, or an end to military exercises, North Korea will not leave negotiations with 
benefits. When North Korea understands that it is unable to achieve concessions, it will 
then only have the option of making real changes in order to survive.  
 The second thing America can do is promote negotiations with multiple parties; 
rather than through bilateral talks. When the United States involves its allies the chance 
of miscommunication or misperception dramatically decreases. There are a few ways this 
can be accomplished. First, Russia and China must be convinced to not provide North 
Korea the necessary resources to survive. Throughout the 1990s China picked up the 
Soviet Union’s slack, and limited the United States efforts to suffocate North Korea’s 
                                                 
124 Tae-Hwan Kwak, "The Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Building Through The Four-Party 
Peace Talks: Re-Evaluation And Policy Recommendations," The Journal of East Asian Affairs 17, no. 1 
(2003): 1-32. 
Nuclear Program and Negotiation 
 
32 
regime by providing aid to Kim Jong Il. America did provide assistance to North Korea 
from time-to-time; however, when negotiations were not taking place, America 
significantly ramped up sanctions against North Korea. America should pressure the 
Chinese and Russian governments to not repeat these steps, for they indirectly supported 
North Korea’s nuclear development.  
 Finally, America needs to understand the diplomacy of North Korea, and how it 
differs from American style of diplomacy. North Korea emphasizes relationship building 
and respect as key components of negotiation. For North Korea, “concepts of national 
autonomy and sovereignty play a key role” in establishing solid relations.125 In contrast, 
American negotiations throughout the 1990s were disjointed, involved multiple parties, 
and provided a lack of consistency. America must understand that North Korea’s 
diplomatic tactics are culturally different than its own. Within that realm of 
understanding America should primarily send consistent teams of diplomats, rather than 
sending different individuals each time. Additionally, America should not focus on the 
end result of the negotiations, but instead pursue steps to de-escalate any crisis which 
may arise.  
Strategic Recommendations 
Strategically, America should implement recommendations which can lower 
crisis levels, and build international cooperation. A few key policies should be pursued to 
achieve these goals. Firstly, America should promote a policy which avoids nuclear 
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conflict while also promoting regime change from the inside.126 America will, most 
likely, be unable to convince North Korea of completely denuclearizing, due to the 
importance nuclear weapons play in North Korea’s economic, social, and diplomatic 
survival. Instead of pursuing external change, America should promote NGOs smuggling 
information into North Korea, and provide economic assistance, along with diplomatic 
immunity, to North Korean refugees fleeing the regime. External Information is already 
falling into the hands of the North Korean population. Smugglers have sent 10-20,000 
USB drives into North Korea in 2016 alone, and banned literature is entering at a similar 
pace.127 These USB’s provide movies with democratic messages, Bible verses, and 
democratic documents. Information is the key to promoting internal change, and 
financial, social, or political support should be a priority for the administration.  
 Second, America, while containing the North Korean threat, should work with 
Beijing to prevent nuclear information from spreading past China’s borders. For Beijing, 
a nuclear North Korea is a threat to its interests, and China will, “likely…restrain North 
Korea from expanding its nuclear program, and, most importantly, to stop it from 
exporting its nuclear materials.”128 The Trump Administration should look towards 
China, and find common ground on the North Korean issue through nuclear non-
proliferation abroad. Interacting with China is not an easy task; however, America can 
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promote collective attempts at denuclearization primary because China does not want to 
be responsible for unpredictable alliances.129  
Finally, America should focus on human rights abuses when attending talks with 
North Korean leaders. Ronald Reagan met with Russian leaders to discuss nuclear 
proliferation. However, he also railed against Russia’s human rights abuses, calling the 
USSR an “evil empire”130. In the same way, the Trump administration should negotiate 
with North Korea, but they should also use each public opportunity to highlight the many 
atrocities North Korea has committed. President Trump has not done so on an effective 
scale, and has missed opportunities to draw attention to human rights at the Trump-Kim 
summit in Singapore along with other opportunities when he has interacted with Japanese 
and South Korean officials.131 Not only will this promote human rights abuses to become 
more widely understood, but it will also set a precedent for North Korea to solve its 
internal issues or face greater international opposition. With the understanding that North 
Korea has 2.6 million slaves within its borders, President Trump should pursue internal 
change and prevent negotiations which do not call attention to human rights.132 
Conclusion 
 North Korea is a nation-state which pursued, and eventually attained, nuclear 
warheads. American reactions throughout the Clinton administration did not provide the 
necessary steps in order to counter North Korea’s threat effectively. Instead, 
                                                 
129 Brian Hilliker, “Threat to Chinese Hegemony,” Liberty University, April 20, 2017, pg. 9. 
130 Ronald, Reagan, "Evil Empire Speech," Speech, Voices of Democracy, July 19, 2018. 
131 Olivia Enos, “Don't Let Kim Jong-Un Ignore Human Rights,” The Heritage Foundation, June 
27th, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/dont-let-kim-jong-un-ignore-human-
rights, accessed November 14, 2018. 
132 Adam, Taylor, "North Korea has 2.6 million ‘modern slaves,’ new report 
estimates," Washington Post, July 19, 2018. 
Nuclear Program and Negotiation 
 
35 
misunderstood diplomatic interests, misperceived motives, and a disinterested 
government pushed North Korea away from the United States. This can be seen through 
the Agreed Framework of 1994, the Four-Party Talks of the late 1990s, and the missile 
talks leading into 2000. Each of these talks led to the unfortunate results of gridlock, 
idealistic thinking, and failure only overcome through future negotiations. Ultimately, the 
North Korean nuclear crisis will need to be resolved from within, and with external 
assistance in order for change to occur. In the meantime, it is in America’s best interest to 
contain the North Korean nuclear threat, and to work with neighboring allies to maintain 
stability in the region.   
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